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Abstract 
Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate 
change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate 
failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement.  This 
paper proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for 
policymakers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that 
they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission 
reductions. We demonstrate this approach to a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price 
Support (a carbon tax). We find that the corporate solvency of energy-intensive 
industries was stable subsequent to its introduction, and therefore that available 
evidence did not support its later weakening. 
Policy Relevance Statement  
This paper is of interest to a wide range of actors, including policymakers at regional, 
national, and international levels across many different departments and ministries, 
from environment and energy through to economics and finance. It speaks to four 
important topics. First, how to minimise the stranded assets and social costs associated 
with delivering decarbonisation. Second, how to make climate policies as objective as 
possible, as well as transparent, so that decisions are aligned with emissions targets 
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and that assumptions underpinning decisions are clearly communicated to markets. 
Third, providing mechanisms that are potentially robust to likely lobbying from fossil 
fuel interests. Fourth and more speculatively, building on nascent interest from central 
banks and financial regulators in climate change topics and exploring the potential to 
collaborate with or learn from this important community.  
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Solvency, Altman’s Z-Score 
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1. Intro 
Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be 
averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if 
they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. At present, policymakers do not have 
a means to accurately and impartially gauge the impact of climate policies on corporate 
solvency. If they did, policymakers could optimise climate policy so that it delivered the least 
loss of corporate solvency for any given level of emissions reduction.  
Here we propose that metrics of corporate solvency be used for this propose. Such measures 
could act as an objective tool for policymakers. In particular, solvency metrics could be used 
to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies. They could also be used as 
 
 
a way to determine the generosity of any industrial compensation to address losses to corporate 
solvency.  
Financial statistics are currently used in this way to calibrate many other areas of government 
policy. For instance, policymakers currently monitor and regulate certain aspects of corporate 
solvency in the financial industry (such as capital reserve requirements) in order to reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy while maintaining profitability. Similarly central banks also consult 
economic statistics when determining monetary policy. 
The fundamental goal of climate policy is to incentivize emissions reductions and the transition 
to lower-carbon processes and technologies. When firms face new costs related to reducing 
carbon emissions it is expected that they will suffer some loss of financial condition as they 
restructure their businesses to minimize these (Requate & Unold, 2003; Demailly & Quirion, 
2006). However, if the firm becomes bankrupt as a result of such policies, not only will this 
restructuring not occur – possibly causing high-emitting industries to expand in less 
constrained jurisdictions (carbon leakage) – but social value can also be permanently destroyed 
in the form of; the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, 
and the incurrence of costs on unemployed workers. 
For example, in a meta-analysis of past studies on the cost to investors of corporate bankruptcy, 
Branch (2002) estimates that 12-20% of the firm’s original value is lost in the liquidation 
process. Similar average losses to firm value of 11% to 17% and 10% to 20% were estimated 
by Altman (1984) and Andrade & Kaplan (1998), respectively. Examining the human capital 
loss associated with employer bankruptcy, Graham, Kim, Li, & Jiaping (2013) find that former 
employees lost 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages for at least five years after bankruptcy, and that 
the present value of all employee wage losses amounted to 29% to 49% of the average pre-
bankruptcy market value of the firm. Other research into the loss of employee earnings has 
 
 
found similarly persistent and large effects such as Couch & Placzek (2010): 32%; Jacobson, 
LaLonde, & Sullivan (1993): 25%; and Fallick (1996): at least 14%. Finally, there is the further 
risk that a sudden industry-wide loss of solvency in affected industries could incite a wider 
financial panic (Krause, Bach, & Koomey, 1989; Caldecott, 2011; Carney, 2015).  
Nevertheless, an excessively lenient climate policy with low future carbon price expectations 
could fail to restrain industry from investments in long-lived carbon-intensive infrastructure 
that could become stranded1, and therefore potentially induce the need for a more rapid and 
expensive industrial transition in order to meet fixed climate change goals. An ideal solvency 
trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would therefore cause corporate solvency 
to initially decline – approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels – and then gradually 
improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved, at which 
point the carbon-limiting regulation would continue. If any compensation was provided to 
industry to help offset reductions in solvency, these would also then be gradually phased-out. 
This sequence is depicted by the U-shaped solvency trajectory in Figure 1 below. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Due to the discrete social costs associated with the threshold of bankruptcy, this discontinuity 
represents the fundamental performance criterion on which to base the adjustment of 
environmental policy. An additional advantage of using financial statistics to calibrate 
environmental policies generally is the fact that this process would be comparatively objective. 
At present, there is considerable potential for industrial outcry and political lobbying to 
influence policy resulting in negative social consequences. Indeed even when the need for 
regulatory change has been obvious, policymakers often struggle to enact needed reforms, and 
even when successful, often fail to do so in a timely manner. For instance, it is widely 
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acknowledged that EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has failed to deliver a price signal 
consistent with intentions since at least the beginning of 2012, when price levels stabilised 
below 5€/ton CO2.2 However, a plan to redress this situation was not approved by the EU 
Commission until 2014, and this plan is not due to be implemented until 2021. This situation 
has led to calls for an overhaul of the EU ETS governance structure (Grosjean, Acworth, 
Flachsland, & Marschinski, 2016). By contrast, a climate change policy based on corporate 
solvency could be adjusted relatively mechanically at each financial reporting period, and 
would be automatically sensitive to variations in the business cycle.3 
The remainder of this paper applies this climate policy calibration framework to a case study 
of one of the most recent and significant additions to climate change legislation: the United 
Kingdom’s Carbon Price Support (CPS). The CPS was introduced on April 1st 2013 as an an 
added surcharge to the Climate Change Levy (CCL): a pre-existing tax on the use of energy 
delivered to non-domestic users in the United Kingdom. The CPS is calculated based on a top-
up payment to the price level of EU ETS permits. Although the CPS was slated to rise 
incrementally to £30 per ton CO2 in 2020, scheduled price increases were frozen in 2015 (see 
Table 1 for a complete history). When the CPS is combined with the price of EU ETS permits 
it is known as the Carbon Price Floor (CPF). Although CCL rates are paid directly by 
businesses for their energy supply, the CPS is paid by owners of energy generating stations, 
and so may indirectly increase industrial electricity costs.4 The CPS is a unilateral tax that the 
UK enacted without the participation of any other EU member state in response to the 
aforementioned chronic failure of the EU ETS; and a desire by the UK to meet its commitments 
                                                     
2 In 2003 (well before the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’s launch in 2005) the UK government regulator Ofgem expected price levels to 
have risen to 33-49€/ton by 2010 (Ofgem, 2003), and the lowest price scenario for EU ETS permits forecasted for 2012 by McKinsey & Co 
was 20€/ton CO2 (UBS, 2003). 
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to; generate 15% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020, and to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The CPS is a relevant case study for applying our policy calibration methodology because it is 
one of the world’s most recent and substantial carbon taxes and is administered in a large 
developed economy with good financial micro-data. Within industry it has also been widely 
claimed that the CPS has had a significant effect on the production costs of manufacturers.5 
The EEF (the UK Manufacturers' Association) for instance has said that the Carbon Price 
Support added between five and ten per cent to the energy bills of energy-intensive companies, 
making them less competitive on the international stage (Shankleman, 2014), and that energy 
prices and green taxes are worrying the industry more than any other issue (Groom, 2014). 
Given these characteristics, other internationally competitive manufacturing nations trialling 
carbon pricing may find the UK’s experience of the CPS applicable to their own situations. 
This paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 conducts a literature review on how optimal climate 
change policy is currently modelled as well as the economic effects of climate policy generally. 
In Section 3 we outline how we measure corporate solvency and provide an exposition of the 
data used in this study. Section 4 presents the results on the effects of the CPS on the corporate 
solvency of energy-intensive firms, Section 5 provides a discussion of these results, and Section 
6 concludes. 
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However, within manufacturing there are a number of industries whose products are exceptionally energy-intensive. We examine the effect 
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2. Literature Review 
The idea of using objective financial statistics to calibrate the optimal strictness of policy 
measures is not new. It is perhaps most prevalent in the views that fiscal and monetary policy 
can be used to smooth the business cycle. With regard to monetary policy, central banks 
continuously scan financial and economic statistics to moderate lending strategies. In the case 
of climate change, models for optimal policy determination have been based on cost-benefit 
assumptions and either analyse which policy instrument would be best - for example a tax 
versus cap and trade permits (Nordhaus, 1993; Mandell, 2005; Wirl, 2012; Strand, 2013), or 
prescribe an optimal level of stringency and timing for a particular policy based on historical 
market dynamics and a specified emissions goal (Roughgarden & Schneider, 1999; Golosov, 
Hassler, Krusell, & Tsyvinski, 2014). Refinements of these models explore how the optimality 
of this policy is influenced by relaxing certain assumptions, such as that the damages 
anticipated from climate change are uncertain (Nordhaus, 1994; Pizer, 1999; Baker & Shittu, 
2008), that abatement technologies improve over time (Goulder & Mathai, 2000; Requate & 
von Dollen, 2008; Gerlagh, Kverndokk, & Rosendahl, 2009; Weber & Neuhoff, 2010; Ploeg 
& Withagen, 2014), or that abatement policies are nationally unilateral (Felder & Rutherford, 
1993; Bohringer, Carbone, & Rutherford, 2012; Eichener & Pethig; 2013). However, even in 
the most realistic scenarios it is only by assuming away actual uncertainties surrounding the 
evolutions of the business cycle and firm cost functions that these studies are able to calculate 
an optimal stringency of climate policy. These assumptions are of course artifice. In the real 
world the progression of the economy and technology are unknowns (see for instance 
Lachmann, 1977[1959] and Hayek, 1978), and it would therefore be more fitting to inquire 
how policy could be adjusted in order to adapt to the way in which these uncertainties unfold. 
Some previous research has hinted at these problems such as van den Bergh (2004) which 
rejects quantitative cost-benefit frameworks for assessing climate change policies, arguing that 
 
 
the complexity of climate change demands a qualitative analytical approach. In our view the 
method of empirically calibrating climate policy proposed here synthesises the strengths of 
both these approaches, on the one hand objectively balancing costs and benefits, and on the 
other explicitly taking into account real world uncertainties. 
Although the effects of carbon regulation on certain aspects of economic performance are well 
documented (see for instance Zhang & Baranzini, 2004; Abrell, Ndoye Faye, & Zachmann, 
2011; Yu, 2011; Zhao, 2011; Chan, Li, & Zhang, 2013), no previous studies specifically 
investigating the effect of environmental regulation on corporate solvency were found. Indeed, 
this may be the first paper to explicitly suggest that indicators of financial performance be used 
to continuously calibrate the stringency of environmental regulation generally. Previous 
research into this issue has instead focused on one-time cost-benefit analyses of a particular 
policy (see Hahn, 2000 for an overview), and then subsequently produced normative 
conclusions about the desirability of this policy from these. 
Nor was it possible to identify previous research on general economic effects attributable to 
the CPS specifically.6 To date, empirical economic analyses of carbon taxes in the UK have 
focused on the Climate Change Levy (CCL) which began in 2001. Early research on this tax 
by the industry lobby group ‘The Federation of Small Businesses’ found that, net of various 
compensatory dispensations granted simultaneously, the CCL made 30% of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises financially worse off, with the primary losers involved in plastics 
processing, hospitality, and retailing (2002). Another survey-based study by industry found 
that 42% of professionals in the energy industry felt that the CCL had caused a net increase in 
business costs (London Electricity, 2002). By contrast, later academic research by Martin, de 
Preux, and Wagner (2014) analysed the effects of the CCL by employing an instrumental 
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variable for CCL incidence on microdata of firm performance. They found that, although the 
CCL had a strong negative impact on the energy intensity of production and electricity use, no 
statistically significant economic effects were observed with respect to; firm revenue, 
employment, or plant exit from the UK. The disjoint observed in this case between the extent 
of industrial outcry on the one hand, and the lack of demonstrable financial harm on the other, 
may reflect an intrinsic bias in corporate responses to environmental regulation generally. 
3. Methodology and Data 
This study measures corporate solvency by constructing Altman’s Z-Scores produced with 
financial data from energy intensive firms in the EU’s 5 main economies. Altman (1968) was 
among the first to put forward a quantitative model to predict corporate bankruptcy using 
financial data, and his various Z-Score coefficients (for different types of firms) have been 
widely applied in industry and are regarded in academic circles as a research standard. The 
most recently published (Altman, 1983) Z-Score coefficients for private manufacturing firms 
are reproduced below. The combined scores of these coefficients predict the likelihood of 
default, with higher scores indicating higher solvency. 
Z-Score = 0.717X1 + 0.847X2 + 3.107X3 + 0.420X4 + 0.998X5    (1) 
where; 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
X4 = Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities  
X5 = Sales/Total Assets 
 
 
 
Although Altman’s Z-score was originally developed as a tool to predict future default, like 
this study, previous research has used comparisons of Altman’s Z-Scores over successive years 
to monitor firm condition and alert firm management of the need to adjust strategy and 
operations (Sauer, 2002). Altman (2002) himself also advocates that the use of his Z-Scores be 
extended from bankruptcy prediction to the measurement of corporate financial risk generally. 
Consistent with this view, Platt & Platt (1991) also find that Z-score profiles for failing 
businesses often exhibit a consistent downward trend as they approach bankruptcy. 
A number of other models exist for predicting bankruptcy, perhaps the most notable of these 
used on UK firms is Taffler’s Z (Taffler, 1983). However, Taffler’s Z would not have been an 
ideal metric for this study as it is constructed from listed firms only and its additional data 
requirements would have reduced our sample size to statistically trivial levels. Since the most 
recently publicized Altman Z-Score coefficients were constructed from private US 
manufacturing firms and are now dated7, in order to better fit our sample this study produces 
updated Altman Z-Score coefficients derived from energy-intensive firms in the EU.  
Discriminant Analysis is the statistical technique used by Altman to classify firms as either 
solvent or bankrupt. In the first phase of Discriminant Analysis, a sample of firms is taken 
whose subsequent bankruptcy status is known, and their characteristics are used to calculate Z-
Score coefficients. In the second phase, these coefficients are applied to the original data in 
order to classify these firms into fitted ‘solvent’ or ‘bankrupt’ statuses. Then the ‘actual statuses’ 
and ‘fitted statuses’ of the same firms are compared, and Z-Score thresholds for expected 
solvency and bankruptcy are determined by the values beyond which all ‘actual’ bankruptcy 
statuses of firms have the correct ‘fitted’ status. In the third phase, these Z-Score coefficients 
are now applied to the characteristics of new observations with an unknown grouping. 
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Observations with estimated Z-Scores within a solvency or bankruptcy threshold are deemed 
to have that status. If estimated Z-Scores are between these thresholds, they are said to belong 
to a ‘grey area’ and to have indeterminate group status.  
Following this methodology our analysis consists of first producing updated Altman’s Z-Score 
coefficients based on the financial condition and bankruptcy status of private energy-intensive 
firms in the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. These advanced economies were chosen 
as it was thought that firms in these countries would be the most comparable to those in UK, 
having similar characteristics, such as technology and management practices. Firms were 
deemed to be ‘energy-intensive’ (and therefore included in the sample) if the European 
Commission defined them as such according to their primary SIC codes (see Appendix). In 
order to calculate the Altman Z-Score coefficients, financial data for only the most recent year 
available between 2000-2014 was collected on active and bankrupt firms from Bureau Van 
Dyke’s Orbis Database. All firms in energy-intensive industries which could be identified as 
‘retail or wholesale trading’ (and therefore not actually manufacturing firms), were removed.8  
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 below show the resulting dataset of 6,777 active 
firms and 177 bankrupt firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Using our sample of active and bankrupt firms, a Discriminant Analysis of bankruptcy was run 
against the variables X1-X5 in Equation (1)9, producing the coefficients necessary to calculate 
Altman’s Z-Score estimates.    
                                                     
8 Orbis classifies firms involved solely in the retail and wholesale trade of energy-intensive goods as in the same industry as those firms 
involved in manufacture. For our purposes this is an erroneous classification. 
9 There are two differences between our methodology and Altman’s. These are that the Retained Earnings variable in X2 and the Book Value 
of Equity variable in X4 is proxied by the related variable ‘Shareholder Funds’ due to lack of data. 
 
 
Using these five coefficients we next calculate Altman Z-Scores for a sample of energy-
intensive firms operating in 2012 and 2013 in the UK (affected by the CPS), and Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain (not affected by the CPS).  These firms were also collected from 
Bureau Van Dyke’s Orbis database. This exercise produced an initial sample of 16,223 firms. 
Internet research was then conducted in order to remove firms which were; (i) involved solely 
in the retail and wholesale trade of energy-intensive goods rather than their manufacture, (ii) 
UK firms which had any production facilities outside of Great Britain (including Northern 
Ireland which was exempt from the CPS), (iii) German, French, Italian, and Spanish firms 
which had production facilities outside of these same four ‘control’ countries, and (iv) firms 
which were listed on a stock exchange10. Naturally only firms which had published all required 
financial data to construct Altman Z-Scores for the 2012 and 2013 financial years were retained. 
This produced a sample of 463 firms, 74 of which were UK based. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Rather than use our estimated Z-Score to predict bankruptcy, in the next stage of the analysis 
we use the Z-Scores to compare levels of corporate solvency between those firms affected and 
not affected by the CPS.11 In particular, we compare the Z-Scores of firms in the UK and 
outside the UK for the 2013 fiscal year in order to test whether UK firms had relatively lower 
solvency, and also by comparing the Z-Scores of UK firms between 2012 and 2013: the year 
before, and of, the CPS’s implementation. This comparison was done by using a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test for differences in the cumulative distribution functions of two variables. 
The K-S test will indicate whether the treated and control cumulative Z-Score distributions are 
statistically different from one another, and will also indicate the direction (higher or lower) of 
                                                     
10 Listed firms were removed in order to ensure comparability. Researchers use different models and thresholds to categorise the solvency of 
listed and non-listed firms, and therefore it would not be clear how to integrate them together. In any event, only 6 listed firms remained 
after the selection criteria i-iii were applied.  
11 This is done because we are interested in changes in solvency, not predicting which firms will go bankrupt. 
 
 
this difference. Note that multiple regression analysis is less appropriate in this case because 
we are solely interested in determining the comparative financial condition of firms, and not in 
isolating or quantifying the effect of the CPS. Moreover, unlike regression or a comparison of 
means12, a K-S test is non-parametric and distribution-free. 
4. Analysis and Results 
In the first stage of our analysis we calculate the Altman Z-Score coefficients for the energy 
intensive firms in the five countries in our sample. This exercise yielded the following results;  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
The results in Table 4 show that these five combined factors are a significant determinant of 
firm bankruptcy. The canonical correlation describes how much discriminating ability a 
function possesses with the maximum possible value being unity. The coefficients produced 
by the discriminant analysis are presented in Table 5 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
The negative coefficient for X2 (Retained Earnings) implies that, counter to expectations, 
increases in the (Shareholder Funds/Total Assets) ratio increases financial distress13. This 
adverse result could be due to sampling or modelling issues. In particular, we proxy Retained 
Earnings with Shareholder Funds. However, there are 85 firms in our sample of 6,777 which 
have data on Retained Earnings. For these firms the correlation between Altman’s original 
variable for X2 (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) and the proxied variable for X2 (Shareholder 
Funds/Total Assets) was found to be 0.47. Given that the coefficient on X2 is close to zero, we 
                                                     
12 Regression analyses yield the same results and these are available from the authors on request. 
13 Discriminant Analysis was also run with a random sample stratified by country and industrial sector of 177 solvent firms on the 177 
bankrupt firms. However, all coefficients on the five financial ratios from this exercise were unexpectedly negative, suggesting problematic 
sampling error due to this reduced sample size.  
 
 
could also attribute this result to error in our proxy choice for X2. Alternatively companies with 
relatively high proportions of equity (low leverage) could be suffering from difficulties raising 
debt due to business problems not captured by the balance sheet. 
Using these estimated coefficients we now calculate the Z-Scores for our sample of 463 treated 
and control firms. Summary statistics of these Z-Scores are presented in Table 6 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
Figure 2 below plots the distributions of the 2013 UK and Non-UK Z-Scores. We test whether 
the 2013 UK firm Z-Scores are lower than the 2013 Non-UK firms using a K-S test, the results 
of which are presented in Table 7.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
Surprisingly, the K-S test finds that in 2013 the UK Z-Scores were in fact significantly greater 
than the Non-UK Z-Scores with a high level of confidence. This implies that firms under the 
CPS were in an even stronger financial position than those that were not. A possible 
explanation for this counterintuitive result may be that economic conditions were generally 
better in the UK than the Non-UK sample, as evidenced by increases in UK GDP throughout 
2013 of 1.73%, versus Germany: 1.06%, France: 0.28%, Italy: -1.93%, and Spain: -1.23% 
(World Bank Data). Fixed-effects regression analyses in Appendix B also support the 
conclusion that contemporaneous macroeconomic improvements negated any solvency effect 
of the CPS.  
The lack of an observed change in corporate solvency suggests that the financial position of 
UK energy-intensive firms was not, net of macroeconomic conditions, heavily impacted by the 
 
 
CPS at the end of the 2013 financial year. To further examine this assertion, we compare the 
2012 and 2013 Z-Scores for energy-intensive firms in the UK only. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
Visual inspection confirms the similarity of Z-Score distributions between 2012 and 2013 for 
firms in the UK-only, and as expected, the K-S test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
equivalence of the distributions. This result also suggests that the CPS did not put undue 
financial pressure on the firms most affected by it. Nevertheless, if we examine the 2012 and 
2013 UK Z-Score means in Table 5 we see that the average decreased slightly from 1.18 to 
1.17. So although there is no statistical difference between the 2012 and 2013 UK Z-Scores, 
we did measure a small solvency loss. 
As a robustness check, we also examine the change in corporate death rates (bankruptcy) for 
energy-intensive firms in the UK between 2012-2013 in Table 8. Here we find that not only 
did corporate death rates for these firms not increase between 2012-2013, they in fact fell 
marginally. 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
5. Discussion 
5.1 The Effect of the CPS 
We found that; (i) 2013 Z-Scores for energy-intensive firms in the UK are statistically higher 
than Non-UK Z-Scores, (ii) although corporate solvency for UK energy-intensive firms fell 
marginally the change was statistically indistinguishable, and (iii) that the death rate of energy-
intensive firms in the UK in fact decreased between 2012-2013. Therefore, on net, the evidence 
 
 
suggests that energy-intensive firms in the UK were not under undue financial strain as a result 
of the imposition of the CPS. Therefore, we would argue that the industrial outcry raised against 
the CPS, and UK policymakers’ decision to freeze planned price increases in response, was 
unwarranted. 
However, two principle qualifications to this result should be noted. To begin with, there is the 
obvious criticism that it may take longer than a single financial year for the full effects of the 
Carbon Price Support to materialise. Nevertheless, previous research that has investigated time-
varying effects of environmental regulation on economic outcomes tends to find negative 
effects in the first year, followed by positive effects in subsequent years (Kozluk & Zipperer, 
2013). While it is almost certainly the case that solvency responses to climate-related 
legislation develop gradually over a number of years, over even longer timeframes it has been 
argued by Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) that properly designed 
environmental policies can stimulate innovation that may partially or even fully offset the costs 
of compliance. In addition, it has also been shown by Xepapadeas & DeZeeuw (1999) and 
Commins, Lyons, Schiffbauer, & Tol (2011) that increases in production costs due to carbon 
prices lead firms to increase average productivity. Hence, long-term negative impacts of a 
carbon tax might also be less than those measured over the shorter-term, and potentially even 
a net positive to firm performance. Finally, this criticism would be easily addressed in practice 
via the continuous solvency monitoring proposed here. 
Another possible criticism against our finding that the CPS did not have a strong negative effect 
on solvency is that, since the CPS was implemented through the tax system rather than as a 
contractual arrangement (as in the case of the EU ETS), the repeal and/or amendment of the 
CPS is a comparatively simple exercise (as turned out to be the case in 2014). Hence, energy-
intensive firms may have discounted the threat that the CPS posed to their future profitability, 
and therefore may not have responded as dramatically as they would have if they had believed 
 
 
the CPS was credibly a long-term policy (Fankhauser, 2013; Lofgren, Wrake, Hagberg & Roth, 
2014).  
In spite of these qualifications, given that the ultimate purpose of this paper is to illustrate the 
possibility of using corporate solvency to calibrate climate policy generally, and not attribute 
an effect of the CPS on solvency specifically, we believe that this analysis is still instructive. 
5.2 Solvency Levels and Optimal Policy 
The question of where the optimal solvency threshold should lie is crucial for the practical 
application of climate policy calibration. For instance, depending on the regulator’s particular 
goals the relevant policy benchmark could be either; (i) an overall average solvency level, (ii) 
a minimum solvency level for the most financially distressed firm, (iii) or a maximum solvency 
loss for the most affected firm. Moreover, the policy goal may not just be solvency for affected 
firms but also their competitiveness, in which case, depending on the regulations faced by 
international competitors, the optimal lower bound for solvency may need to be raised in Figure 
1 from financial distress to some other higher level. The availability and timeliness of financial 
data will also influence the optimal threshold. Since the financial position of firms may 
deteriorate between financial reports, it may be prudent to adjust thresholds upwards to add a 
margin of safety against rapid solvency losses. Of course, it would be equally essential to 
ensure that firms could not ‘game’ their financial statements in order to present an artificially 
dire picture to sympathetic regulators. It may also be the case that within a given emissions 
target, it may not be possible to maintain the solvency of all affected firms. In such cases the 
emissions target may need to take precedence over solvency concerns, but nevertheless the use 
of policy calibration via solvency could still be an efficient way to minimize the bankruptcy 
losses that may be necessary in order to achieve a desired emissions goal. Future research will 
no doubt refine this optimal policy threshold. 
 
 
Future research may also look to refining the Altman Z-Scores produced above, or compare 
other methods for producing metrics of corporate solvency, such as conditional probability 
models. Such research could also quantify and operationalize the ‘optimal’ trajectory of 
corporate solvency depicted in Figure 1 according to specific industries, industrial policies, 
macroeconomic conditions, financial reporting regimes, and climate change targets. Historical 
instances of other significant environmental regulation such as the sulfur dioxide cap & trade 
program in the US or automobile emissions standards could also be evaluated from the 
standpoint of optimal corporate solvency trajectories for affected firms; improving our 
understanding of the efficiency of these interventions, and highlighting areas of possible 
improvement for current and future environmental policies. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has introduced solvency targeting as a means for policymakers to efficiently 
calibrate the stringency of environmental policies. This technique was applied to the UK’s 
recent Carbon Price Support (CPS) climate policy. Using Altman Z-Scores as a measure of 
solvency, for energy-intensive firms it was found that; (i) 2013 corporate solvency in the UK 
was statistically higher than for Non-UK firms, (ii) although corporate solvency for UK energy-
intensive firms fell marginally between 2012-2013 the change was statistically 
indistinguishable, and (iii) that the death rate of energy-intensive firms in the UK in fact 
decreased between over the same period. Therefore, on net the evidence supports the 
conclusion that energy-intensive firms in the UK were not under inordinate financial strain as 
a result of the CPS, and therefore that the subsequent postponement of planned CPS price 
increases was unjustified. In order to meet now deferred climate goals and to deal with the 
possibility of rising economic and climate uncertainty, governments may be compelled to enact 
increasingly strict carbon-limiting policies. Against this backdrop, the employment of an 
 
 
objective tool to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policy may prove a valuable 
addition to mitgating the social costs of climate transition. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Idealised Solvency Trajectory for Industries Affected by Climate Policy 
 
Table 1: UK Carbon Price Support History 
 Ratified Start End Effect 
Carbon Price 
Support (CPS) 
Tax on fossil fuels 
used to generate 
electricity (Northern 
Ireland Exempt) 
Mar 23rd  
2011 
Apr 1st 2013 Apr 1st 
2030 
£4.94/ton CO2 in 2013, rising 
£9.55 in 2014, £18.08 in 2015 and 
incrementally to £30 in 2020 and 
£70 in 2030 
CPS Price Freeze Mar 19th  
2014 
Apr 1st 2014 Apr 1st 
2019 
Frozen to £18.08/ton CO2 from 
April 1st 2015 until 2020 
CPS Compensation 
Scheme 
May 22nd 
201414 
April 1st 2015 
(is 
retroactive) 
TBD Up to 85% of CPS paid returned for 
energy-intensive industries 
Source: House of Commons Library (23 November 2016). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Ratified by the EU Commission. 
Solvency 
Trajectory 
Financial 
Distress 
Normal 
Solvency 
Start of carbon 
pricing/regulation 
Maximum 
cumulative impact  
New steady state – firms adapted 
to new carbon price/regulation 
 
 
Table 2: Discriminant Analysis Energy-Intensive Firms Descriptive Statistics 2000-2014, 
£000’s (n=6,777) 
 Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Working capital -212,111 3,477,310 6,326 63,762 
Shareholder funds -152,285 4,225,684 11,798 105,597 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) -1,786,512 647,452 -40 26,907 
Sales -1,019 8,706,000 35,741 246,621 
Total liabilities -78 6,581,976 10,875 114,605 
Total assets 0 10,066,105 33,639 286,154 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets -17.36 1.00 0.26 0.42 
X2 = Shareholder Funds/Total Assets -6,398.50 1.87 -1.10 79.80 
X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets -599.39 2.82 -0.14 7.79 
X4 = Book Value of Equity/Total Liabilities -3,252.71 4,568.34 3.98 84.08 
X5 = Sales/Total Assets -1.00 354.77 1.41 5.90 
Number of Observations 
UK 513 
Germany 480 
France 774 
Italy 2,363 
Spain 2,824 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics UK and Non-UK firms (n=463) 
Number of Observations 
Country 
UK 74 
Germany 33 
France 138 
Italy 216 
Spain 2 
Industry Sector 
Chemicals 156 
Metals 101 
Primary 7 
Textiles 146 
Paper 53 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Discriminant Analysis Diagnostic Statistics 
Canonical Correlation Likelihood Ratio F-Statistic Probability 
0.1317 0.98262 24.536 0.0000 
 
Table 5: Discriminant Analysis Estimated Coefficients 
X1 0.9677312 
X2 -0.0472769 
X3 0.3463303 
X4 0.0632979 
X5 0.3756524 
 
Table 6: Altman Z-Score Summary Statistics  
 N Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Altman’s Z-Score 2012 463 -0.15 16.52 0.93 0.92 
Altman’s Z-Score 2013 463 -0.21 20.39 0.97 1.20 
Non-UK Altman’s Z-Score 2012 389 -0.15 16.52 0.89 0.97 
Non-UK Altman’s Z-Score 2013 389 -0.21 20.39 0.94 1.28 
UK-only Altman’s Z-Score 2012 74 0.11 3.76 1.18 0.62 
UK-only Altman’s Z-Score 2013 74 0.10 4.12 1.17 0.64 
 
Figure 2: UK and Non-UK 2013 Energy-intensive Firm Altman’s Z-Score Histograms: 
(n=74), (n=389) 
 
Kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth  = 0.1779 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Equality of 2013 UK and Non-UK Z-Score 
Distributions 
 Largest Difference P-value 
UK > Non-UK 0.3001 0.000 
UK < Non-UK -0.0103 0.987 
Combined Test 0.3001 0.000 
 
Figure 3: UK-only 2012 and 2013 Energy-intensive Firm Altman’s Z-Score Histograms, 
(n=74) 
  
 Kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth  = 0.1779 
 
 
Table 8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Equality of UK 2012 and 2013 Z-Score 
Distributions 
 Largest 
Difference 
P-value 
2013 > 2012 0.0541 0.806 
2013 < 2012 -0.0946 0.516 
Combined Test 0.0946 0.895 
 
Table 9: UK Energy-intensive Firm Business Deaths and Survival 2012 and 2013 
 2012 2013 
Deaths 665 690 
Survival 6,190 6,410 
Death Rate 10.80% 10.76% 
Source: ONS Business Demography 2013. Represents annual data based on the 2007 SIC Code conversions of 2003 SIC Code data from Table 
9 in the Appendix; ending on November of the stated year. 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Table 10: European Union Official Energy-intensive Industries 
2003 SIC 
Code 
2007 SIC 
Code 
Description 
27.42 24420 Aluminium production 
14.3 08910 Mining of chemical and mineral fertilizer minerals 
24.13 20130 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 
27.43 24430 Lead, zinc and tin production 
18.1 14110 Manufacture of leather clothes 
27.1 24100 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 
21.12 17120 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 
24.15 20150 Manufacture of fertilizer and nitrogen compounds 
27.44 24440 Copper production 
24.14 20140 Manufacture of other orga nic basic chemicals 
17.11 13100 Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres 
24.7 20600 Manufacture of man-made fibres 
13.1 07100 Mining of iron ores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20160 
The following sub-sectors within manufacture of plastics 
in primary forms 
 
24161039 – Low-density polyethylene 
 
24161035 – Linear low-density polyethylene 
 
24161050 – High-density polyethylene 
 
24165130 – Polypropylene 
 
24163010 – Polyvinyl chloride 
 
24164040 – Polycarbonate 
 
21.11 
 
17110 
 
The following sub-sectors within manufacture of pulp 
 
21111400 – Mechanical Pulp 
 
  
 
 
Appendix B 
In order to test for the likely causes of a positive and null effect of the CPS on corporate 
solvency, we employ a fixed-effects regression with respect to each firm’s Altman Z-Score 
between 2012-2013. For control variables we use; Total Assets from the year before the CPS 
program (ie 2012), industrial sector, and change in macroeconomic variables: GDP, Inflation 
Rate, Unemployment Rate, and GBP Exchange Rate. Note that for non-UK firms, increases in 
the ‘Δ Exchange Rate with GBP’ variable corresponds to a strengthening of the Euro relative 
to the pound. For UK firms, the ‘Δ Exchange Rate with GBP’ variable is always zero. 
Table 12: Fixed Effects Regression Summary Statistics (n=463) 
 Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Δ Altman’s Z-Score (2012-2013) -2.62 11.35 0.04 0.67 
Total Assets 2012 (£‘000s) 8 3,060,205 32,019 171,384 
Country Number of Observations 
UK 74 
Germany 33 
France 138 
Italy 216 
Spain 2 
Industry Sector 
Chemicals 156 
Metals 101 
Primary 7 
Textiles 146 
Paper 53 
 
A step-wise regression is run, sequentially incorporating first just the treatment variable 
(Carbon Price Support), second the firm specific controls, and finally the macroeconomic 
controls. We also run an interaction between the Carbon Price Support and Total Assets 
variable in order to test whether there may be a differential effect with respect to firm size; this 
might occur, for instance, due to economies of scale in the costs of CPS compliance.  
A unique aspect of the Carbon Price Support as opposed to other studies of carbon prices is 
that approval for a compensation program for energy-intensive industries was not granted until 
 
 
over a year after the imposition of the tax (see Table 1) 15. Hence, for the first year of the 
program the measured effect of the CPS on corporate solvency can be more accurately isolated. 
Table 13: Fixed-effects regression by firm 2012-2013, n=463 (74 UK firms) 
 (1) 
Δ Altman’s Z 
(2) 
Δ Altman’s Z 
(3) 
Δ Altman’s Z 
(4) 
Δ Altman’s Z 
VARIABLES Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects 
     
Carbon Price Support -0.0101 -0.0325 -0.237* -0.246* 
 (0.0776) (0.0823) (0.132) (0.137) 
Total Assets 2012 (‘000s)  -2.18e-08 -4.04e-08 -4.96e-08 
  (1.79e-07) (1.82e-07) (1.86e-07) 
Carbon Price Support×Total Assets 2012    2.34e-07 
    (9.32e-07) 
Metals  0.000290 0.0570 0.0581 
  (0.0699) (0.0869) (0.0870) 
Primary  0.0664 -0.00939 -0.00972 
  (0.251) (0.260) (0.260) 
Textiles  0.165*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 
  (0.0552) (0.0802) (0.0803) 
Paper  0.0252 0.0508 0.0499 
  (0.0925) (0.106) (0.106) 
ΔGDP 2012-2013   0.333** 0.334** 
   (0.152) (0.153) 
ΔInterest Rate 2012-2013   0.322 0.322 
   (0.201) (0.201) 
ΔUnemployment Rate 2012-2013   0.772* 0.772* 
   (0.422) (0.422) 
ΔExchange rate with GBP 2012-2013   -0.867 -0.876 
   (1.743) (1.745) 
     
Observations 463 463 463 463 
R-squared 0.000 0.019 0.034 0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable is Δ Altman’s Z-Score 
Omitted industry sector dummy is Chemicals 
 
As we can see from Table 10, with industry and macroeconomic controls the Carbon Price 
Support exhibits a statistically significant effect in the anticipated direction and at the 10% 
level, which can be considered significant given the one-tailed nature of this test. The 
macroeconomic control variables; ‘ΔGDP’ and ‘ΔExchange Rate’ exhibit their theoretically 
expected signs, whereas the expected sign of ‘ΔInterest Rate’ and ‘ΔUnemployment Rate’ may 
                                                     
15 The EU ETS for instance used free permit allocations to affect this outcome, and countries imposing carbon taxes such as Finland, Sweden, 
and Norway all provided equivalent dispensations to their most vulnerable firms. 
 
 
be more ambiguous16. The control variables which demonstrate statistical significance are the 
Textile industry dummy, ‘ΔGDP’, and ‘ΔUnemployment’. Although this analysis supports the 
conclusion that increases in GDP in the UK relative to control countries is responsible for our 
finding that there was no solvency loss as a result of the CPS, a notable limitation of these 
models is the low proportion of the total variance explained. 
                                                     
16 For instance, net of GDP changes, increases in the ‘Δ Unemployment Rate’ variable could in fact be proxying for lower wage costs to the 
firm. 
